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The rapid aging of the population creates substantial financing problems for existing 
pay-as-you-go  Social  Security  programs.  Governments  around  the  world  are  therefore 
considering shifting completely or partially to investment-based defined contribution plans in 
which employees contribute a fraction of their wages to individual accounts, invest the funds 
in a combination of stocks and bonds, and use the accumulated assets to finance a retirement 
annuity. Some governments have already made this shift.  Such prefunded programs offer the 
prospect of financing future retirement benefits with substantially smaller sacrifices during 
working years than the taxes that would be required in traditional unfunded pay-as-you-go 
(“paygo”) programs. They have the potential disadvantage, however, of exposing retirees to 
the uncertainty associated with the variable returns on stocks and bonds. Despite the 
importance of this issue, there has been no analysis of the magnitude of the risk to which 
retirees would be exposed in a system of individual defined contribution accounts. 
The analysis in this paper takes the pay-as-you-go benefits promised in current law 
(essentially a continuation of current replacement rates) as the benchmark and shows that 
the risk that future retirees would receive less than this “benchmark” level of benefits in a 
pure  defined  contribution  system  would  be  relatively  small  at  saving  rates  that  are 
substantially less than the future paygo tax rate required to fund that benchmark level of 
benefits.  This pure investment-based plan is an extreme case; the investment risk can be 
reduced  by  using  a  mixed  system  that  combines  pay-as-you-go  and  investment  based 
components or that makes intergenerational transfers conditional on the performance of stock 
and bond prices (Feldstein and Ranguelova, 1998).  
1  Defined Contributions vs. Defined Benefits 
Samuelson (1958) established the well known result that individuals in a paygo system earn 
an implicit rate of return in a steady state equilibrium equal to the real rate of growth of the 
social security tax base, i.e., the sum of the growth rates of the labor force and real wages. 
The introduction of a new paygo plan provides an immediate windfall to those who are 
already retired or who will soon retire because they receive benefits with little or no previous -2-
contributions.  Subsequent increases in benefits financed by higher tax rates provide similar 
windfalls to those who are then retired or soon to be retired.  When program expansions can 
no longer provide such windfall gains, the implicit return of a paygo program eventually 
decreases to the Samuelsonian rate of aggregate wage growth.  For the United States, this 
has averaged 2.5 percent over the past 30 years.   
The return earned by any particular birth cohort will vary from the steady state rate 
in response to changes in the ratio of retirees to workers caused by changes in labor force 
participation,  birth  rates  and  death  rates,  and  in  the  ratio  of  taxable  wages  to  total 
compensation including fringe benefits.  Caldwell et. al. (1998) estimate that current Social 
Security rules imply that the real rate of return on Social Security contributions will be 2.4 
percent for the generation born right after World War II but only about 1 percent for those 
born in the 1970s and essentially zero for those born at the end of the 1990s. Because of the 
aging of the population, the Social Security actuaries (Board of Trustees, 1998)  estimate that 
the current 12.4 percent tax rate will have to increase to more than 18 percent by the year 
2035 to maintain the current benefit-wage replacement rates. 
This combination of the low implied rate of return for current and future taxpayers 
and the prospect of a substantial increase in future Social Security tax rates has stimulated 
interest  in  investment-based  alternatives  to  the  current  pay-as-you-go  system.  The 
fundamental economic difference between the two approaches is that the investment based 
system involves an initial reduction of national consumption and a concurrent increase in the 
national capital stock. The rate of return in an investment-based plan is therefore the 
marginal product of capital, a number substantially greater than the rate of growth of 
aggregate wages. Note that the relative advantage of an investment based plan depends on 
the marginal product of capital relative to the growth rate of wages and not on the return on 
equity investments relative to the return on government bonds, as some have suggested.  
A simplified calculation indicates the large effect of this difference in rates of return on 
the cost of funding retirement benefits. Assume an overlapping generations framework in -3-
which there are T years between generations. In the paygo system, individuals receive 
benefits T years after they pay tax; in the investment-based system, individuals spend their 
accumulated assets T years after they make the savings deposit. If the implicit rate of return 
in a paygo system is denoted  g n + = γ here nis the growth rate of the labor force and  g is 
the rate of growth of average wages, the Samuelson (1958) analysis implies that each dollar of 
retirement income at time T requires a tax payment of  () T γ − exp dollars at the earlier 
contribution date. Similarly, if ✣ is the marginal product of capital, each dollar of retirement 
income at T requires a contribution to the personal retirement account (PRA) of  () T ρ − exp  
at the contribution date.  The ratio of the PRA contribution to the paygo tax payment to 
finance the same benefit T years later is  () T ρ γ − exp . With ✏ = 0.025, ✣ = 0.085 and T = 30 
years,  () = − T ρ γ exp 0.165, i.e., each dollar of tax payment required in a paygo system can be 
replaced by just 16.5 cents in a funded program with an 8.5 percent rate of return.  The 18 
percent future payroll tax rate projected by the Social Security Administration could in 
principle be replaced by a funded program with mandatory contributions equal to 3.0 percent 
of earnings.  
This comparison of the potential long-run gains from switching to an investment-based 
system
1 ignores not only the risk issues that are the subject of this paper but also questions 
about (1) how the paygo benefits are financed during the transition to an investment based 
system, (2) the administrative costs of an investment based plan, and (3) the distributional 
consequences of substituting an investment based plan for the existing paygo system. These 
issues are discussed extensively elsewhere (Diamond (1997), Feldstein (1996), Feldstein and 
Samwick (1997, 1998a,1998b), Kotlikoff (1998), Shoven (1999), and Feldstein and Liebman 
(1999)) and will not be considered here.  
1 There is a present value gain at the time of the switch if corporate and personal capital income taxes cause the 
net-of-tax rate at which individuals discount future consumption to be less than the marginal product of capital. 
 There is no present value gain if this tax wedge is ignored and the rate of discount is assumed equal to the 
marginal product of capital; see Murphy and Welch (1998) and Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998).  -4-
 
2  An Investment-Based Defined Contribution Plan with 
Variable Annuity Benefits 
This  section  describes  the  system  of  Personal  Retirement  Accounts  in  which  a 
representative individual accumulates assets that are converted to a variable rate annuity at 
the time of retirement.  Individuals who die before retirement remain in the annuity pool 
(although alternative bequest rules are possible, as explained in Feldstein and Ranguelova 
(1999).) The representative individual enters the labor force at age 21 and retires at age 67 (if 
he or she is still alive). For the sake of concreteness, we use the economic and demographic 
projections of the Social Security Administration (Board of Trustees, 1998) for the cohort 
reaching age 21 in 1998. We assume that the representative individual has his birth cohort’s 
average earnings at each age and experiences the cohort’s age-specific mortality rates. 
In the defined benefit plan specified in the current Social Security law, an individual 
with such average earnings experience would receive a benefit at age 67 for himself equal to 
40 percent of his immediate preretirement wage. The full defined benefit benchmark in our 
simulations  is  a  multiple  of  this  amount  that  reflects  benefits  for  a  spouse  or  other 
dependants as well as disability benefits.  Instead of modeling such additional benefits 
explicitly, we use a multiple of the individual benefit such that the implied aggregate Social 
Security benefits in each year beginning in 2030 is equal to the aggregate benefit projected by 
the Social Security Administration. The aggregate benefits projected in this way together 
with the aggregate wage income projected by the Social Security Administration (Board of 
Trustees, 1998) imply that the paygo tax rate required to pay benefits will be 18.4 percent 
when the cohort that we study retires (in contrast to the current tax rate of 12.4 percent).  
These assumptions about future defined benefits do not affect the projected behavior of the 
defined contribution annuities but provide a benchmark for comparing the relative costs of 
defined benefit and defined contribution programs. -5-
With a defined contribution plan, the individual contributes a fixed percentage of 
wages  in  each  year  to  a  Personal  Retirement  Account  (PRA);  we  will  examine  the 
implications of different saving rates from 4 percent to 9 percent (i.e., up to half of the long-
run paygo tax rate of 18.4 percent). The individual invests these savings in a portfolio that is 
continually rebalanced to maintain 60 percent equities and 40 percent debt, a ratio that 
corresponds  approximately to the debt-equity ratio of U.S. corporations so that the portfolio 
rate of return corresponds to the return on corporate capital without considerations of the 
relative yields on debt and equity. At retirement, these accumulated assets are used to 
finance a variable annuity in which annual benefits vary with portfolio performance in a way 
described below. 
We use the S&P500 index and a Salomon Brothers corporate bond index as proxies for 
the stock and bond investments. Both indices are assumed to follow a geometric random walk 
with drift. his implies that the log returns for each type of asset are serially independent and 
identically distributed with given mean and variance. Thus if pe (s) and pb (s) are the log 
levels of the equity and bond indices at time s, we assume pe (s) = pe (s-1) + ✙e+ ue (s)  and 
pb (s) =   pb (s-1) + ✙b+ ub (s) where ue ~ iid N (0, ✤
2
e) and  ub ~ iid N (0, ✤
2
b).  The covariance 
between the stock and bond returns is ✤e b . 
With a continuously compounded 60:40 equity-debt portfolio, the log level of the 
overall portfolio would, if there were no additions or payments, satisfy p (s) = p (s-1) + ✙ + 
u (s) with  u ~ iid N (0, ✤
2).  (In practice, the value of the PRA portfolio is also increased by 
the annual savings of a fraction of the individual’s wage plus the distributed share of the 
PRA balances of all those members of the age cohort who die during the previous year; the 
explicit evolution is shown below.) To derive the values of ✙ and ✤
.2 we use the lognormal 
property of the returns. More specifically, if ✙*i, is the mean return on asset i in level form, 
the mean return on the 60:40 portfolio is the weighted average ✙* = 0.6  ✙e + 0.4  ✙b* .  
Because we assume the log returns to be normally distributed,  
✙i  =  ✙i  + 0.5 ✤
2
i . This implies that ✙ + 0.5 ✤
2 = 0.6 (✙e  + 0.5 ✤
2
e) + 0.4 (✙b  + 0.5 ✤
2
b) where -6-
✤
2 = 0.36 ✤
2
e + 0.16 ✤
2
b + 0.48 ✤e b. From these two equations and the measured mean and 
variance of the log returns on stocks and bonds we can derive the log return on the portfolio 
and the variance of that return. 
The CRSP data for the postwar period from 1946 through 1995 imply that for stocks 
and  bonds  the  mean  real  log  rates  of  return  were  7.0  percent  and  3.3  percent.
2 T h e  
corresponding standard deviations are 16.6 percent for stocks and 10.4 percent for bonds.  
The covariance of the stock and bond returns is ✤eb = 0.0081.  Taken together, these 
parameters imply a logarithmic rate of return on the 60:40 portfolio of 5.9 percent with a 
standard deviation of 12.5 percent.  We reduce the mean return from 5.9 percent to 5.5 
percent to reflect potential administrative costs, more than the 0.2 percent charged now by 
major index funds or the 37 basis point fee for the combined saving and variable annuity 
product recently introduced by TIAA-CREF.  
In the analysis that follows, we recognize that the adjusted mean real log return of 5.5 
percent for the portfolio during the period from 1946 through 1995 is only an estimate of the 
relevant mean for future years. Our stochastic simulation therefore uses a two step procedure 
 to simulate the uncertain future annual returns. For each of 10,000 simulations,  we begin by 
generating a mean real log return on the portfolio from a normal distribution with a mean of 
0.055  and  a  standard  deviation  of  0.0175  which  is  equal to the standard error of the 
2 The mean portfolio return is essentially unchanged if we use a longer time period from 1926 to 1997.  The 
annual bond rates of return are based on the Salomon Brothers AAA bond returns adjusted to a more typical 
corporate bond yield by adding two percentage points. Although there are no comparable data on the annual 
holding period return of lower grade bonds, the variance of such bond yields would presumably be higher and 
the correlation with equity yields would also differ. We do not attempt to take these into account.  The effect of 
ignoring this would almost certainly be small relative to the understatement of the mean return that results 
from ignoring the additional corporate tax revenue that the government receives because of the increased capital 
stock. Estimates by Poterba (1997) imply that the corporate taxes on capital and capital income collected by 
federal, state and local governments is equivalent to 3.4 percent of the incremental capital.  The federal 
corporate tax alone is equivalent to an additional 2.2 percent per cent return. Although a specific mechanism for 
crediting these taxes is not considered in this paper, they should be recognized as part of the return of an 
investment based system.  See Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) for a more complete analysis of this corporate 
tax revenue.  -7-
estimated mean based on the number of years in the sample. We then use this       estimated 
realization of the mean and the standard       deviation of 0.125 to generate a 71 year sequence of 
portfolio returns from the year 2000 to 2070.  We repeat this 10,000 times.  
Although the equation for p(s) describes the way that the logarithmic value of the 
PRA account would evolve during the accumulation years if there were no external additions, 
in practice the actual individual PRA account is also augmented by the fraction ..of the 
individual’s wage and by the distributed share of the PRA balances of those members of the 
cohort who die during the year. We simulate this evolution at the level of the birth cohort 
(rather than of the individual) by: M(s) = [ 1 + R (s-1) ] M(s-1) + ✍ w(s) N(s) where M(s) is 
the aggregate PRA balance for the cohort as a whole, R(s) is the rate of return in period s, 
N(s) is the number of living members of the cohort, w(s) is average wage and ✍ is the share 
of wages that is saved and contributed to the PRA accounts.  Since this equation is in level 
rather than logarithmic form, the value of 1 + R(s) = exp [r(s)] where r(s) is the logarithmic 
rate of return in period s implied by r(s) = p(s) - p (s-1) = ✙ + u(s). Note that E[r(s)] =  
0.055 and the standard deviation of r(s) = 0.125 imply that E[1+R(s)] = E[e
r(s)] = e
E[r(s)]+0.5✤2 = 
1.065. 
 
2.1  The Variable Annuity 
We assume that this same stock-bond portfolio is used to finance the variable annuity 
during retirement.  A variable annuity adjusts the annual benefit according to the changes in 
the value of the accumulation account.  More specifically, the initial annuity benefit that is 
paid at age 67 (on an annuity purchased at age 66) reflects the PRA assets at the beginning 
of  the  individual’s  66
th  year,  the  expected  mortality  rates  at  all  future  ages,  and  the 
assumption that the future return will be equal to the expected log return of 5.5 percent.  No 
adjustment in the rate   of return is needed to compensate for the uncertainty because the 
individual retirees bear the risk of fluctuations in the rate of return.  
One year later, the size of the variable annuity payment is increased or decreased from -8-
the initial value in proportion to the change in the market value of the PRA assets relative to 
the market value that would have prevailed if the expected 5.5 percent log return had 
actually  occurred.  A  similar  revision  of  the  annual  annuity  payment  occurs  in  each 
subsequent year.  
To derive the explicit value of the variable annuity, consider the individuals in a 
particular birth cohort.  Let the time index coincide with the age of the cohort so that Nt is 
the number of individuals alive at age t. Let A66 be the be the value of the PRA assets at the 
beginning of the 66
th year and let R be the expected annual real rate of return on the 
portfolio of assets used to finance the retirement annuity.  The first annuity benefit is paid at 
the beginning of the individual’s 67
th year and annually thereafter. The cost at age 66 of a 
fixed real annuity of $1 for life (i.e., an annuity that starts with $1 and grows in proportion 
to the level of consumer prices) is the actuarial present value (APV) of that dollar with the 
discount rate equal to the expected real rate of return on the investment portfolio:  
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− −
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+ = ∑
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t
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APV  
where we assume that all individuals alive at age 99 die at the end of the 100
th year.  
Since the PRA account has assets equal to A 66 when the annuity is established, the 
annual annuity payment that the individual would receive in the 67
th year is 
APV
A
a
66
67 =  
if the expected return of R is actually realized in the 66
th year. More generally, if the expected 
return R is realized in every future year, the individual would continue to receive that same 
annuity payment and the accumulated assets at age 66 of all members of that birth cohort 
would be exhausted when the last member of the cohort dies at age 100.  
In practice, of course, the actual rate of return varies from year to year. The annuity 
payments are adjusted in proportion to the annual changes in the asset value in such a way 
that the birth cohort’s accumulated fund is still exhausted over the 34 year retirement period. 
If Rt is the actual rate of increase of the asset value during year t, the asset value at the 
beginning of the cohort’s 67
th year is  () 66 67 1 R A A + = . The annuity paid in that year is -9-
therefore a67 = 
R
R
APV
A
+
+
×
1
1 66 66 . Similarly the annuity at age 68 reflects the changes in the 
market value of the assets during the 66
th and 67
th years:  
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The last payment to those who are 100 years old is 
R
R
a a
+
+
=
1
1 99
99 100 . Note that if the rate of 
return in each period is equal to the expected rate of return the annuity remains constant at 
67 a .  
3  Individual Risk in a Defined Contribution Plan 
In this section we assess the risk that an individual will receive an unacceptably low 
retirement annuity in  an investment-based defined contribution plan. More specifically, we 
estimate the distribution of annuity values associated with different PRA saving rates and 
relate those annuity levels to the benefits currently promised in the Social Security defined 
benefit paygo system. We refer to this level of future benefits promised in current law as the 
“benchmark” Social Security benefits, mindful of the fact that these benefits could only be 
provided in a paygo system by increasing taxes substantially and that there are many 
proposals to reduce actual future benefits. We use these calculations to assess the extent to 
which individuals can reduce the risk of receiving a low annuity by using a higher saving rate 
while still saving less than the amount that would be paid in taxes in a pure paygo system.  
Before examining the implications of the uncertain portfolio returns, it is useful to 
note the saving rate that would be required to fund the future benchmark Social Security 
benefits if the representative individual received the mean log return of 5.5 percent during 
both the preretirement accumulation and the retirement annuity. The annuity is calibrated to 
correspond not only to the benefit of the individual retiree but also to include dependents’ 
benefits and disability benefits in a way that matches the projected aggregate OASDI  
benefits (as described above). The payroll tax required to finance these benefits in a pure 
paygo program is projected to rise to 18.4 percent of earnings as the ratio of retirees to -10-
employees increases. In contrast, a 3.1 percent saving rate (as a percentage of the same total 
earnings) would provide the same benefits in a defined contribution plan with a 5.5 percent 
rate of return. 
The variability of portfolio returns implies that saving this amount will produce a 
retirement annuity that may either exceed or fall short of the benchmark Social Security 
benefit. To assess the probability distribution of the annuities,  we generate the 10,000 
simulations described above of the 80 year sequence of portfolio returns corresponding to the 
years when the members of the birth cohort are aged 21 through 100. For each of these 
10,000 time series, we generate the path of PRA assets and variable annuity payments 
corresponding to different saving rates from 4 percent of earnings to 9 percent of earnings. 
With a saving rate of 4 percent of earnings the median annuity at age 67 (in the 
10,000 simulations) is 41 percent more than the benchmark Social Security benefit; see 
column 1of Table 1.  In 66 percent of the simulations the annuity at age 67 () 67 a  exceeds the 
benchmark Social Security benefit. But in the worst 10 percent of the simulations, the 
annuity is less than 52 percent of the benchmark Social Security benefit. Because of this risk 
of a low annuity, it would be prudent for individuals to save a higher fraction of earnings. 
Before  looking  at  the  implication  of  increasing  the  saving  rate,  consider  the 
corresponding annuity distributions for older retirees. The median ratio of the defined 
contribution annuity to the benchmark Social Security benefit declines gradually as the 
cohort ages (1.41 at age 67, 1.30 at age 77, and 1.22 at age 87) but remains substantially 
greater than 100 percent of the benchmark. Similarly, the fraction of times that the annuity 
would exceed the benchmark Social Security benefit decreases monotonically with age: from 
66 percent at age 67 to 56 percent at age 87. The annuity level at the tenth percentile also 
becomes lower as the cohort ages, declining from 52 percent of the benchmark Social Security 
benefit at age 67 to 37 percent of benefits at age 77, 27 percent at age 87. It is clear from 
these figures that it would be desirable to consider a higher saving rate during working years.
  Increasing the saving rate to 6 percent achieves a very substantial reduction in the -11-
risk of low benefits as well as an increase in the size of the annuity associated with average 
portfolio performance. The median annuity at age 67 is now 2.12 times the benchmark Social 
Security benefit; see column 2 of Table 1. Since the benchmark benefit for an individual 
retiree is about 40 percent of preretirement earnings, this corresponds to a replacement rate 
of 85 percent of preretirement earnings.   
The six percent saving rate reduces the probability that the annuity at age 67 is less 
than the benchmark Social Security benefit to 17 percent. There is only a 5 percent chance 
that the age 67 annuity is less than 61 percent of the benchmark Social Security benefit. 
Increasing the saving rate to 9 percent (still less than half of the projected pay-as-you-
go tax rate) raises the distribution of benefits substantially. There is less than a 10 percent 
chance that the benefit is less than 1.1 times the benchmark level and less than a 5 percent 
chance that it is less than 92 percent of the benchmark benefit. 
This favorable performance continues at older ages. The median annuity is nearly 
twice the benchmark Social Security benefit at age 77, and 1.83 times the benchmark at age 
87. The probability of receiving an annuity that is less than the benchmark benefit remains 
low, rising from 17 percent at age 67 to less than 31 percent at 87. 
In considering these favorable distributions, it is worth emphasizing that the paygo tax 
required to finance the benchmark Social Security benefits that are used as the standard of 
comparison will rise to more than 18 percent during the next 40 years. Individuals could 
instead achieve much higher expected benefits and face only very little risk of lower benefits 
while saving substantially less than the long-run paygo tax rate. 
 
3.1  A CRRA Expected Utility Evaluation 
Although we believe that displaying the probability distributions of possible outcomes, 
as we do in Table 1, is the best way to indicate the risks and rewards of the alternative 
investment-based options, we now present explicit summary calculations based on expected 
values of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. To evaluate the PRA -12-
options presented in Table 1, we consider a representative individual with expected utility 
function  
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where  Ε is the expectation operator,  ()
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C u  with ✏ here being the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion,  t p is the probability of surviving to age t from age 21, ✎ is the time 
discount factor at which utility is discounted, and ✏ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
We do the analysis with a time discount factor of 0.98; alternative calculations with a greater 
time discount (✎ = 0.96) and with no time discount factor (✎ = 1) have very little effect on 
the results that we report below.  We recognize the restrictive nature of this specification.  
The function is additively separable and the relative risk aversion in each period,  γ = −
'
' '
u
c u
, 
is a constant and is independent of age. Despite these limitations, these calculations may be 
useful to some readers as a supplement to the direct information of Table 1. 
We evaluate this function for a representative agent who is age 21 in 1998. The 
individual earns the age specific wage for this cohort projected by the Social Security 
actuaries and pays a proportional income tax equal to 20 percent of that wage. With a 6 
percent rate of PRA saving, the net income during the working years from age 21 to age 66 is 
74 percent of the gross wage. (Although we are looking at officially projected wages beginning 
in 1998l, to avoid the complexities of modeling the transition we compare a fully phased in 
PRA system with the paygo system that would exist in the more distant future.) The 
individual is assumed to do no other saving, making the consumption in each preretirement 
year the same 74 percent of pretax wages, a feature that makes the individual’s utility more 
sensitive to fluctuations in the return to PRA saving. During retirement the individual’s 
consumption is the variable annuity that is generated by the PRA savings, as described in 
section 2.1 above. Similar simulations are done also for PRA plans with saving rates of 4 -13-
percent and 9 percent.  We contrast each of these to a paygo system in which the tax rate is 
18 percent, making the net consumption during the preretirement years equal to 62 percent 
of preretirement income. This paygo system is assumed to provide the benchmark level of 
benefits prescribed in current law during each retirement year with no uncertainty. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is the key parameter in this expected utility 
evaluation. The values of inferred in the finance literature from the difference between the 
yields on stocks and on “risk free” treasury bills are implausibly high, giving rise to the label 
“equity premium puzzle.”
3 Instead of using these implausibly high values, we use the following 
mental experiment to help decide on appropriate CRRA values.  
The representative individual in our example will reach age 67 in the year 2044 and 
will be retired during the decades that follow. The level of retirement consumption that the 
PRA will provide at that time might be conservatively approximated to be $40,000 in today’s 
prices; the precise level does not matter for our example. Consider two equally probable 
states of nature. In the good state the retiree has income and consumption of $40,000.  In the 
bad  state,  it  is  only  $20,000.  In  the  mental  experiment,  we  give  the  individual  the 
opportunity to increase consumption in the bad state by one dollar by agreeing to reduce 
consumption if the good state occurs. We can infer the individual’s CRRA ✏ coefficient by 
observing how much the individual would be willing to give up in the good state to increase 
consumption in the bad state by one dollar. 
Any risk averse individual (✏ > 0) would be willing to give up more than a dollar in 
the good state for a dollar in the bad state. If the individual would give up two dollars in the 
good state, but no more, to increase consumption in the bad state by one dollar, we infer that 
' u  = (20,000) = 2 ' u  =(40,000).  Since the CRRA form noted above implies  ()
γ − =
1 ' C c u
 ., the 
3 See for example Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Kocherlakota (1996). The difference between the equity yield 
and the yield on Treasury bills has of course declined in recent years, implying a lower measure of risk aversion. 
If the “riskless” security is taken to be an asset with no credit risk and with a guaranteed long-term real return, 
the comparison should be the recently created Treasury Inflation Protected Securities.  These TIPS now have a 
yield of about 4 percent, not that different from the earnings-price ratio on equities.  -14-
condition that  ' u = (20,000) = 2 ' u  =(40,000) implies that 2✏ = 2 or ✏ = 1. 
Similarly, we can infer that if the representative individual is willing to give up four 
dollars of consumption in the good state (when consumption would otherwise be $40,000) to 
have an additional dollar of consumption in the bad state when consumption would otherwise 
be $20,000, the coefficient of CRRA becomes ✏ = 2. And a representative individual who 
would give up eight dollars in the good state for one extra dollar in the bad state has a 
CRRA value of ✏ = 3. 
Readers can decide how much is reasonable to assume that someone would give up 
when income is $40,000 for a dollar when the income would otherwise be $20,000. Without 
choosing a specific value, we believe that the plausible sacrifice amount would be less than 
eight dollars and probably less than four dollars, i.e.,✏ < 3 and probably ✏ < 2. 
4    
We drew 10,000 independent histories of the 80-year sequence (from age 21 in 1998 to 
age  100  in  2077)  of  returns  on  the  PRA  savings  of  the  representative  individual  and 
calculated the expected utility value associate with each value of ✏. Our calculations show 
that the PRA with a 6 percent mandatory saving rate is preferable to the paygo for the 
relative risk aversion coefficient up to ✏ = 3.4.  With a 4 percent saving rate the critical value 
of ✏ is 2.95 while with a 9 percent saving rate the PRA system is preferred to paygo for all 
values of ✏ less than 3.85. 
The comparison of the expected lifetime utilities of the PRA and the paygo systems 
reflects time preference as well as risk preference.  During the individuals’ working years, the 
paygo requires an 18 percent tax while the PRA only involves a saving rate of between 4 
percent and 9 percent. Differences in time preference (in our analysis) therefore influence the 
relative desirability of the two options. To abstract from this and focus just on the difference 
4 These values of gamma do not imply enough risk aversion to explain why some households do not invest in 
equities. However, many individuals may not because the cost of learning how to invest in equities exceeds the 
extra return on their very small amount of financial assets. Half of U.S. households approach retirement age 
with less than $12,000 in financial assets. With $10,000 of investable funds, the extra real return from investing 
in equities might be about $400 a year. -15-
between the presumed-certain paygo benefit and the stochastic PRA annuity, we apply the 
expected utility calculation just to the incomes in the retirement years.  In other words, we 
disregard the PRA system’s advantage of requiring much lower contributions during working 
years than the 18 percent paygo tax. With a saving rate of 6 percent, the median PRA 
annuity is substantially greater than the benchmark benefit; table 1 shows that the median 
PRA annuity at age 67 is 2.12 times the benchmark benefit. Although there is a 17 percent 
chance that the PRA annuity will fall below the benchmark benefit at age 67 (and a greater 
chance at higher ages), the explicit utility evaluation starting at age 67 shows that the 
stochastic PRA annuity is preferred to the “certain” paygo benefit for all CRRA coefficients 
up to 2.4.  With a four percent saving rate this critical value of becomes 1.6 while with a 
saving rate of 9 percent the PRA option is preferred for all values of up to 3.1. In short, for 
plausible CRRA risk aversion parameters, the preference for the PRA option does not depend 
on the lower contribution during the working years. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the risk aspects of an investment-based defined contribution 
Social Security plan. We focus on the risks after the plan is fully phased in so that all 
employees and retirees are participants in the plan. To be concrete, we base our calculations 
on the detailed projections of economic and demographic variables by the Social Security 
Administration and the Census Bureau for the 80 year period beginning in 1998. We assume 
that the new defined contribution program begins with the birth cohort that is 21 in 1998.  
In this plan, individuals are required to deposit a specified fraction of wages to a 
Personal Retirement Account, invest these funds in a 60:40 equity-debt mix, and in a 
similarly invested variable annuity at age 67. The value of the assets in the Personal 
Retirement Accounts follows a random walk with the mean and variance of a 60:40 equity-
debt portfolio over the period from 1946 to 1995, a mean log return of 5.5 percent (net of 
administrative costs of 0.4 percent) and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent. We study -16-
stochastic distributions of this process by doing 10,000 simulations of the 80 year experience 
from 1998 to 2077. 
The resulting annuities are compared to the future defined benefits promised in the 
current Social Security law, a level that we refer to as the “benchmark” Social Security 
benefits.  The  Social  Security  actuaries  calculate  that  the  aging  of  the  population  and 
increased longevity imply that the future Social Security payroll tax required to finance the 
benchmark benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis would be greater than 18 percent.  
If the 5.5 percent mean log rate of return were known with certainty, individuals could 
purchase the benchmark level of benefits by saving 3.1 percent of earnings, just one-sixth of 
the required tax in the pay-as-you-go plan. But the uncertain nature of the rate of return 
implies that  saving 3.1 percent of wages could produce an annuity that is unacceptably less 
than the benchmark benefits. 
Saving a higher share of wages provides a “cushion” that protects the individual from 
the risk of an unacceptably low level of benefits. For example, an individual who saves 6 
percent of his earnings during his working years from 21 to 66 (with a 5.5 percent mean log 
return) has a 50 percent chance of receiving an annuity at age 67 that is at least 2.1 times 
the  benchmark  level  of  Social  Security  benefits  (and  therefore  about  70  percent  of 
preretirement pretax wages) and only a 17 percent chance that that annuity is less than the 
benchmark Social Security benefit. In 95 percent of the investment experience the annuity 
exceeds 61 percent of the benchmark benefit. A pure defined contribution plan with a 6 
percent saving rate invested in a 60:40 equity-debt Personal Retirement Account can cut the 
individual’s cost of  providing a retirement annuity to one-third of the projected 18 percent 
pay-as-you go tax while leaving the retiree exposed to relatively little risk that the resulting 
annuity will be less than the benchmark level of Social Security benefits projected in current 
law. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the Variable Annuity Payments as a Fraction of 
Benchmark Social Security Benefits   
Based on Mean Log Return of 5.5 Percent          
 
            Age 67                           Age 77                          Age 87        
Cumulative         Saving Rate                   Saving Rate                   Saving Rate     
Probability  0.04     0.06      0.09   0.04    0.06     0.09    0.04    0.06    0.09 
 
       0.01  0.26     0.40      0.59   0.14     0.21    0.32    0.08     0.12     0.18    
       0.02  0.31     0.47      0.71   0.18    0.26     0.40    0.11     0.17     0.25    
       0.05  0.41     0.61      0.92   0.26    0.39     0.59    0.18     0.26     0.40    
       0.10  0.52     0.79      1.18   0.37    0.56     0.84    0.27     0.40     0.60    
       0.20  0.72     1.08      1.62   0.56    0.84     1.26    0.44     0.65     0.98    
       0.30  0.92     1.38      2.08   0.77    1.16     1.74    0.63     0.95     1.43    
       0.40  1.14     1.71      2.57   1.01    1.52     2.28    0.90     1.34     2.01    
 
       0.50  1.41     2.12      3.18   1.30    1.95     2.93    1.22     1.83     2.74    
 
       0.60  1.71     2.57      3.86   1.69    2.54     3.80    1.66     2.49     3.74    
       0.70     2.17     3.26      4.89   2.22    3.34     5.00    2.30     3.45     5.18    
       0.80   2.86     4.29     6.43   3.15    4.72     7.08    3.36     5.04     7.56    
       0.90  4.20     6.30      9.44   5.00    7.49   11.24    5.89     8.84    13.26   
       0.95  5.83     8.74     13.11  7.52    11.28   16.92    9.10     13.66   20.49  
  
       0.98  8.33   12.49    18.73          11.65  17.47   26.21           15.43   23.15   34.72    
       0.99     10.43   15.65    23.48          15.18  22.76   34.15           21.42   32.13   48.20    
 